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DR. JEKYLL'S WAIVER OF MR. HYDE'S RIGHT TO
REFUSE MEDICAL TREATMENT: WASHINGTON'S
NEW LAW AUTHORIZING MENTAL HEALTH CARE
ADVANCE DIRECTIVES NEEDS ADDITIONAL
PROTECTIONS
Nick Anderson
Abstract: Mental health care advance directives are gaining popularity nationwide.
Following a growing trend, the Washington State Legislature has recently passed a law
allowing patients to draft mental health care advance directives that could be irrevocable.
Patients who sign an irrevocable directive essentially waive their fundamental right to refuse
treatment in the future. The United States Supreme Court has held that waivers of
fundamental rights must be made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. However, as
passed, Washington's new law contains insufficient safeguards to guarantee such a waiver.
This Comment proposes that the Washington State Legislature amend this law to require two
additional protections: a "rights advocate" to explain the potential waiver of rights, and a
written warning in the advance directive form. These safeguards will help ensure that patients
make knowing and intelligent waivers of their fundamental right to refuse treatment.
Dr. Jekyll,' a respected physician, lives in Seattle with his wife. Dr.
Jekyll has dissociative identity disorder.2 About once a year his other
personality, Mr. Hyde, takes over, rendering him unable to perform as a
physician. Mr. Hyde always refuses to take the psychotropic medication
that could control the symptoms and speed up Dr. Jekyll's recovery. Yet,
because Mr. Hyde never poses a danger to himself or to others, the State
of Washington will not commit him to a mental hospital against his will
or force him to take medication. Nevertheless, Dr. Jekyll and his wife
agree that taking medication is important. Dr. Jekyll's wife persuades
him to sign an "advance directive," a document authorizing her to
commit him to a mental health facility where he can receive treatment
and medication when he slips into the role of Mr. Hyde. This document
sounds like a good idea to Dr. Jekyll; it will allow him to receive the
treatment he needs so he can recover and return to work. However, when
Dr. Jekyll signs the document, he does not realize he is effectively
waiving his fundamental right to refuse medical treatment later on. Once
1. Character names are the invention of Robert Louis Stevenson. ROBERT Louis STEVENSON,
THE STRANGE CASE OF DR. JEKYLL AND MR. HYDE (1886).
2. Hypothetical created by the author for illustrative purposes.
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the document is signed, Mr. Hyde no longer has the right to refuse
medication, no matter how strongly he protests.
This scenario could soon take place in Washington. The Washington
State Legislature has passed a new law, Mental Health-Advance
Directives for Health Care, which allows a competent individual to sign
a binding, and in some cases irrevocable, mental health advance
directive. a This directive is a document in which a patient gives advance
consent for mental health care treatments.4 A competent Dr. Jekyll could
therefore instruct health care providers how to treat him when he
becomes incompetent and slips into the role of Mr. Hyde. While little
dispute exists over whether there is a constitutional right to refuse
medical treatment in advance, 5 questions remain about a person's right
to irrevocably consent to such treatments in advance. 6 Washington's new
law could allow the state to force an unwilling, mentally ill patient to
take medication if the patient previously gave irrevocable consent to
such treatment.7 The patient's present unwillingness would conflict with
the previously given consent, and this conflict raises a serious concern
about whether irrevocable advance directives might unconstitutionally
infringe upon a patient's right to refuse medical treatment.
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that a patient's
ability to refuse medical treatment is a fundamental right.8 State
legislation cannot permit a person to waive a fundamental right in
advance unless the waiver meets the constitutionally-required "knowing,
voluntary, and intelligent" test.9  This Comment argues that
Washington's new law fails to ensure that patients make such a waiver.
Specifically, the law does not guarantee that patients' waivers of their
fundamental right to refuse treatment are made knowingly and
intelligently.
3. Mental Health-Advance Directives for Health Care, 2003 Wash. Legis. Serv. 283 (West,
WESTLAW through 2003 Sess.) [hereinafter Mental Health Advance Directives].
4. Id.§5.
5. See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261,278 (1990); see also infra note 123 and
accompanying text.
6. See Rebecca S. Dresser, Ulysses and the Psychiatrists: A Legal and Policy Analysis of the
Voluntary Commitment Contract, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 777, 819 (1982).
7. See Mental Health Advance Directives, supra note 3, § 5.
8. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278.
9. Chang v. United States, 250 F.3d 79, 83 (2d Cir. 2001); see also Brady v. United States, 397
U.S. 742, 748 (1970) (establishing the knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver test).
Vol. 78:795, 2003
Mental Health Advance Directives
Part I of this Comment describes advance directives and
Washington's new law. Part II examines a patient's right to refuse
medical treatment and the three requirements for valid waivers of that
right. Part III explores how existing statutes, rules of procedure, and
court-mandated processes provide protections to guarantee that waivers
of fundamental rights are made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently.
Finally, Part IV argues that the Washington State Legislature should
amend the mental health advance directive law to include similar
protections. These protections are necessary to ensure that patients make
knowing and intelligent waivers, and to prevent the new law from being
struck down as unconstitutional.
I. FOLLOWING A GROWING TREND, THE WASHINGTON
STATE LEGISLATURE HAS PASSED A LAW AUTHORIZING
MENTAL HEALTH ADVANCE DIRECTIVES
Advance directives allow patients to give informed consent for certain
treatments in advance.' ° Such directives were first used for end of life
situations, but many patients in the State of Washington have pressed for
statutory authorization to draft advance directives for mental health
care." In response, Washington legislators have passed a law that will
allow patients to create mental health advance directives. 12
A. Advance Directives Allow Patients to Make Decisions About Their
Future Health Care
An advance directive is a legal document that declares a patient's
wishes about medical treatment to be provided should the patient
become incompetent or unable to communicate.' 3 Patients sign advance
directives while they are competent, and the documents remain in effect
even if the patients later become incompetent.14 There are two different
10. Bruce J. Winick, Advance Directive Instruments for Those with Mental Illness, 51 U. MIAMI
L. REv. 57, 70 (1996).
11. See infra note 37 and accompanying text.
12. Mental Health Advance Directives, supra note 3, § 5.
13. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 53 (7th ed. 1999).
14. Robert D. Fleischner, Advance Directives for Mental Health Care: An Analysis of State
Statutes, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 788, 791 (1998).
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types of advance medical directives that allow patients to control their
future health care: proxy directives and instructional directives.'
5
A proxy directive simply allows a patient to authorize someone else
to make decisions on that patient's behalf.' 6 The principal-the patient
who signs the directive-allows the proxy-an agent or personal
representative-to make decisions on the principal's behalf if and when
the principal becomes incompetent.17 Such directives are similar to a
durable power of attorney.' 8 The agency relationship is "durable"
because it lasts even when the principal becomes incompetent.' 9 The
benefit of this arrangement is that it enables the agent to respond flexibly
to changing circumstances when the patient's current wishes are
unknown.2 °
In contrast, an instructional directive is a legal document in which a
person defines what kinds of treatment may be performed in the future if
he or she becomes incompetent and cannot make decisions. 21 One
popular type of instructional advance directive is called a living will. 22 A
living will specifies a person's desire to be taken off life support when
there is little chance of recovery by stating that the signer's life shall not
be artificially prolonged when an extreme physical or mental disability
makes it highly unlikely that the signer will recover.2 3 Many states have
statutes authorizing living wills. 24 In Washington, the Natural Death Act
recognizes "the right of an adult person to make a written directive" to
explain when the person would like life-sustaining treatment removed.25
The legal basis for advance directives is rooted in the tort theory of
informed consent. Advance directives attempt to allow the competent
15. Elizabeth M. Gallagher, Advance Directives for Psychiatric Care: A Theoretical and
Practical Overview for Legal Professionals, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 746, 749 (1998).
16. Id. at 751.
17. JESSE DUKEMINIER & STANLEY M. JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 404 (6th ed.
2000).
18. Id.
19. See id. (describing durable powers of attorney and the UNIFORM HEALTFI-CARE DECISIONS
ACT, 9 U.L.A. 144 (1999)); see also UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 5-501 to -505, 8 U.L.A. 210 (1998).
20. DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 17, at 404.
2 1. Karen L. Schultz & Timothy D. Schultz, Advance Directives: A Primer, 63 TEX. BAR J. 1034,
1036 (Dec. 2000).
22. DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 17, at 403-04.
23. Id.
24. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ch. 765.309(1) (1995); Mo. REV. STAT. § 459.055 (1986); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 32-11-110 (2003).
25. WASH. REV. CODE § 70.122.010 (2003).
Vol. 78:795, 2003
Mental Health Advance Directives
"present self' to give informed consent on behalf of the "future self'
who may become incapacitated.26 All patients must give informed
consent before medical treatment can be administered.27 As a general
rule, a patient's consent should be based on adequate information about
the benefits of medical treatment, the available alternatives, and the risks
involved.28 When treatment is unauthorized or performed without any
consent at all, the health care provider administering the treatment may
be liable for having committed a battery.
29
The rationale behind allowing advance directives is that a person is in
a better position to give true informed consent to mental health care
treatments when he or she is competent than when incompetent.
30
Typically, a competent person can carefully weigh the benefits,
alternatives, and risks of treatment and make an informed decision.3' By
comparison, an incompetent person's ability to evaluate information is
impaired to such an extent that the person lacks the capacity to make
treatment decisions. 32 Consent is essential to the provision of medical
treatment, and advance directives allow informed consent to be given
ahead of time.33
B. Many Washington Patients Wanted Statutory Authorization to
Write Mental Health Advance Directives
In recent years there has been a groundswell of support for advance
directives by mental health consumers, providers, and advocacy
26. See Dresser, supra note 6, at 814 n.134.
27. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 269 (1990) (noting that
"informed consent is generally required for medical treatment" and stating that the "informed
consent doctrine has become firmly entrenched in American tort law"); see also Scott v. Bradford,
606 P.2d 554, 558 (Okla. 1979) (noting an exception to informed consent for emergency
circumstances); Alan Meisel & Lisa D. Kabnick, Informed Consent to Medical Treatment. An
Analysis of Recent Legislation, 41 U. PITT. L. REV. 407, 409-10 (1980) (noting that "[b]y the end of
the 1960's a fairly well-established and well-developed body of common law ... had emerged"
regarding informed consent, and twenty four states enacted legislation between 1975 and 1977).
28. Scott, 606 P.2d at 556-57.
29. Id. at 557.
30. See Dresser, supra note 6, at 785 n.3 1.
31. See Mental Health Advance Directives, supra note 3, § 2(8).
32. See OR. REV. STAT. § 127.700(5) (2003).
33. See Winick, supra note 10, at 70-71 (arguing that advance directives refusing treatment are
more likely to be valid than those requesting treatment, but that the latter does constitute a measure
of proof of informed consent).
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groups.34 Mental health patients-especially those who alternate
between competence and incompetence-have pushed for legislation
allowing mental health advance directives.35 Sixteen states have
responded by enacting statutes specifically authorizing mental health
advance directives.36 Many mental health care patients in Washington
state pressured the Washington State Legislature to pass a similar law.37
One of the major reasons some families of patients wanted statutory
authorization to execute mental health advance directives was to clarify
uncertainty about Washington law.38 Mental health treatment can always
be obtained voluntarily if patients are willing to check themselves into a
treatment facility. 39 However, patients who suffer from mental illness are
often "treatment resistant" and either refuse treatment or do not realize
they need it.40 Even those who do take medication often stop taking it
prematurely as they begin to feel better.4 ' When a mentally ill person
refuses treatment, friends and family must go through a complex public
legal process to have their family member committed involuntarily.
42
Moreover, under Washington State's Involuntary Treatment Act, courts
only authorize involuntary commitment when patients are "gravely
disabled" or pose a risk of serious harm to themselves or to others.
43
Because of the difficult legal standard that existed under Washington
law, families felt frustrated by their inability to help mentally ill
34. See Gallagher, supra note 15, at 748.
35. Email from Erin Speck, Legislative Assistant to Washington State Senator Karen Keiser, to
author (Jan. 27, 2003) (on file with author) [hereinafter Speck Email].
36. DEBRA SREBNIK & LISA BRODOFF, IMPLEMENTING PSYCHIATRIC ADVANCE DIRECTIVES:
SERVICE PROVIDER ISSUES AND ANSWERS 28 (Working Paper, 2003); see, e.g., ALASKA STAT.
§§ 47.30.950-.980 (Michie 2002); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 327F (Michie 2002); IDAHO CODE
§§ 66-601 to -613 (Michie 2002); 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 43/1-115 (2002); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 253B.03(6)(d) (West 2002); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 122C-71 to -77 (2002); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
43A, §§ 11-101 to -113 (West 2002); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.700-737 (2002); TEX. CIV. PRAC. &
REM. CODE ANN. §§ 137.001-.011 (Vernon 2002); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 62A-15-1001 to -1004
(2002).
37. See REPORT FROM THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON CHILDREN & FAMILY SERVICES ON S.B.
5223, 58th Sess., at 3 (Wash. 2003).
38. Speck Email, supra note 35.
39. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.05.050 (2003).
40. See Gallagher, supra note 15, at 747.
41. Michelle Roberts, County Watches Woman Starve Herself to Death; State Leaves
Supervisor ' Missteps Unpunished, THE OREGONIAN, Dec. 29, 2002, at Al.
42. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.05.370.
43. Id. § 71.05.030; see also In re Anderson, 17 Wash. App. 690, 692, 564 P.2d 1190, 1192
(1977).
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relatives. 44 A family's hands were effectively tied-it could not send a
mentally ill family member to a treatment facility if the person did not
meet the strict definition of "gravely disabled," even if the person could
benefit from treatment.45 In the vast majority of involuntary and
voluntary commitment cases, it is the family that seeks commitment or
treatment.46 A legislative assistant paraphrased one patient's passionate
testimony regarding this problem to the Washington State Legislature:
"[w]hen someone is allowed to 'decompose' so severely before they can
get help under the Involuntary Treatment Act, they never come back
quite the same., 47 Many families believe that a mental health advance
directive would allow patients to get the treatment they need before the
patients' mental health deteriorates to the point where it fits the
definition of "gravely disabled. 48
Further, proponents of the new law argued that advance directive
legislation would help cure another inadequacy in Washington law:
situations where incompetent patients cannot communicate the treatment
they want. When incompetent patients are unable to let others know
what type of treatment they prefer, Washington law allows courts to
"make a substituted judgment for the patient as if he or she were
competent to make such a determination., 49 In In re Ingram,50 the
Washington State Supreme Court held that when a court is asked to
make a substituted medical decision for an incompetent person, the court
must attempt to decide as the individual would if he or she were
competent.51 An advance directive allows patients to describe recurring
mental health issues treatments that have worked in the past.
52
44. Michelle Roberts, Free To Die: Oregon's Civil Commitment Standard Makes it Hard to Help
Those Most in Need, THE OREGONIAN, Dec. 30, 2002, at Al (discussing similar problems in
Oregon).
45. Id.
46. SAMUEL JAN BRAKEL ET AL., THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 32 (3d ed. 1985).
47. Speck Email, supra note 35.
48. Id.; Interview with Lisa Brodoff, Professor, Seattle University School of Law, in Seattle,
Wash. (Nov. 14, 2002); see also Post 2002 Leg. Sess., 33D LEGIS. DIST. NEWSLETTER (Sen. Karen
Keiser, Olympia, Wash.), May 2002, at 4 (on file with author).
49. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.05.370(7)(b) (2003).
50. 102 Wash. 2d 827, 689 P.2d 1363 (1984).
51. Id. at 838, 1369.
52. Vonne Worth, Harborview Treats Epilepsy on Involuntary Psych Ward, 12 DIFFERENT TIMES
(Seattle, Wash.), at http://www.psychiatricrights.org/stories/Vworth.htm (last visited June 26,
2003).
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Therefore, a mental health advance directive could be strong evidence of
a patient's wishes on which a court could rely when making such a
substituted judgment.
5 3
Another reason that some Washington citizens wanted statutory
authorization to execute mental health advance directives is that mental
health care providers and patients had concerns about the legal validity
of advance directives based on existing state law. 4 Prior to the bill's
passage, it was unclear whether patients who wanted to execute
irrevocable advance directives could do so. 55 Therefore, patients and
attorneys believed that legislation explicitly authorizing mental health
advance directives would be more useful than the general common law
and vaguely analogous laws allowing advance directives for end of life
situations. 6
Attorneys in Washington had attempted to apply general principles of
state law on living wills and powers of attorney to the unique
circumstances of mental health care.5 7 Although these laws did not
prohibit mental health care advance directives, the actual enforceability
of mental health directives drafted according to such laws was somewhat
uncertain. 8 Mental health care providers were unsure about how to deal
with mental health advance directives in the absence of express statutory
authorization, and were concerned about potential liability for following,
or refusing to follow, mental health care advance directives.5 9 Finally,
many attorneys prefer to rely on a specific grant of statutory authority
when representing a client who wants to draft a mental health advance
directive.
60
C. A New Washington Statute Specifically Authorizes Patients to
Write Mental Health Advance Directives
The Washington State Legislature recently passed a law that
specifically authorizes patients to write mental health advance
53. See Gallagher, supra note 15, at 770-71.
54. See REPORT FROM THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON CHILDREN & FAMILY SERVICES ON S.B.
5223, 58th Sess., at 3 (Wash. 2003).
55. See Speck Email, supra note 35.
56. See Gallagher, supra note 15, at 763.
57. See id. (specifically considering Washington State).
58. See id at 772.
59. See generally SREBNIK & BRODOFF, supra note 36, at 1I.
60. Gallagher, supra note 15, at 771.
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directives. 6 1 The law is called "Mental Health-Advance Directives For
Health Care. 62 In December of 2002, Representative Patricia Lantz and
Senator Karen Keiser proposed House Bill 104163 and Senate Bill
5223,64 respectively, to the Washington State Legislature. On
February 25, 2003, the Judiciary Committee combined the House and
Senate bills into a Substitute Bill that passed both houses.65 On May 14,
2003, Governor Gary Locke signed the bill into law.66 The law became
effective on July 27, 2003.67 This law is the result of a two-year
collaborative drafting process that involved patients, mental health care
providers, attorneys, and legislators.68
Senator Keiser first sponsored this bill when a family with a
schizophrenic son asked her to propose advance directive legislation.
69
Their son was able to function when he was taking his medication, but
periodically he would stop taking it.70 When this happened, he often
ended up on the streets of downtown Seattle in a state of confusion,
where he would threaten passers-by. 7' Sometimes the young man would
find himself in jail or in the emergency room.72 He and his family
wished there were some way to break this cycle and get him help earlier
when he first presented symptoms.7 3 The family wanted to be able to
61. Mental Health Advance Directives, supra note 3, § 5.
62. Id.
63. H.B. 1041, 58th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2003), available at
http://www.leg.wa.gov/wsladmIbillinfo/dspBillSummary (Feb. 12, 2003).
64. S.B. 5223, 58th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2003), available at
http://www.leg.wa.gov/wsladm/billinfo/dspBillSummary (Feb. 12, 2003).
65. Substitute H.B. 1041, 58th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2003), available at
http://www.leg.wa.gov/wsladm/billinfo/dspBillSummary (Apr. 6, 2003).
66. See Mental Health Advance Directives, supra note 3.
67. Id.
68. Telephone Interview with Debra Srebnik, Professor, University of Washington Department of
Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences (Oct. 15, 2002) (Professor Srebnik was a frequent participant in
advance directive stakeholder meetings).
69. Post 2002 Leg. Sess., 33D LEGIS. DIST. NEWSLETTER (Sen. Karen Keiser, Olympia, Wash.),
May 2002, at 4 (on file with author).





secure the treatment their son needed earlier, and they felt that this
legislation would allow them to do so.
74
The new law gives patients a statutory right to execute mental health
care advance directives that will be valid if certain formalities are met.
75
The pertinent section of the law provides:
A directive shall:
(a) Be in writing;
(b) Contain language that clearly indicates that the principal
intends to create a directive;
(c) Be dated and signed by the principal or at the principal's
direction in the principal's presence if the principal is unable
to sign;
(d) Designate whether the principal wishes to be able to
revoke the directive during any period of incapacity or
wishes to be unable to revoke the directive during any
period of incapacity; and
(e) Be witnessed in writing by at least two adults, each of
whom shall declare that he or she personally knows the
principal, was present when the principal dated and signed
the directive, and that the principal did not appear to be
incapacitated or acting under fraud, undue influence, orduress. 7
6
This new Washington law allows principals to make many decisions
for themselves. For example, the law permits patients to choose when
their directive will become effective.77 It also includes a sample form
that patients can use to create their own directives.78 This form includes
a place for patients to indicate, at the time the directive is executed,
whether the directive will be revocable or irrevocable during subsequent
incapacity.
79
Patients or their families can challenge the creation of a mental health
care advance directive in court.80 The legislation specifically authorizes
74. Id.
75. Mental Health Advance Directives, supra note 3, § 5(2).
76. Id. § 6.
77. Id. § 6(3).
78. Id. § 26.
79. Id. § 26 (Part IV).
80. Id. § 20 (stating that "[any person with reasonable cause to believe that a directive has been
created or revoked under circumstances amounting to fraud, duress, or undue influence may petition
the court for appointment of a guardian for the person or to review the actions of the agent or person
alleged to be involved in improper conduct under RCW 11.94.090 or 74.34.110").
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a principal-the person who signs an advance directive-to bring an
action to contest the validity of his or her directive. 8' For example,
patients could argue that their advance directives are not valid because
they were signed under duress, fraud, or undue influence.8 2 Patients
could also argue that they were not competent at the time they signed the
directive.83 Further, families could potentially challenge the directive's
validity by arguing that it was signed unknowingly or unintelligently.
84
An irrevocable mental health advance directive signed under the new
Washington law is, in effect, a waiver of the patient's right to make
future health care decisions because it involves more than merely giving
advance consent for certain medical treatments.85 There is a distinction
between giving consent for treatment and giving up the right to refuse
treatment. 86 With a traditional consent form, a patient can revoke
consent at any time.87 However, with an irrevocable advance directive,
the patient gives up his or her future right to withdraw consent,
effectively waiving the future right to refuse medical treatment during
subsequent incapacity. 88 At the time the directive is signed, the "present
self' waives a right that the "future self' would otherwise possess-the
right to refuse treatment.
89
In sum, in response to public demand, the Washington State
Legislature has passed a new law to ensure that mental health advance
directives are enforceable and to clarify the requirements for executing
such a directive. 90 The law permits patients to execute mental health
advance directives consenting to certain treatments in advance. 91 Patients
have the right to challenge their advance directives in court on the
81. Id. § 12.
82. See id. § 20.
83. See id. § 12.
84. Id. § 20.
85. Dresser, supra note 6, at 819 (arguing that signing a voluntary commitment contract involves
a waiver of rights).
86. See Winick, supra note 10, at 70-71.
87. See, e.g., Washington's Natural Death Act, WASH. REV. CODE § 70.122.040 (2003) (allowing
consent to be withdrawn "at any time").
88. See Mental Health Advance Directives, supra note 3, § 6.
89. Dresser, supra note 6, at 819.
90. Mental Health Advance Directives, supra note 3, § 5.
91. Id.
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grounds that they were improperly executed.92 Yet, an irrevocable
advance directive-in addition to giving the patient's consent for future
treatment-could waive the patient's right to refuse future treatment.
93
II. PATIENTS HAVE A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO REFUSE
MEDICAL TREATMENT THAT CAN ONLY BE WAIVED
VOLUNTARILY, KNOWINGLY, AND INTELLIGENTLY
Fundamental rights are rights that are constitutionally protected
because they are vital to a democratic society. 94 One of the rights the
U.S. Supreme Court has deemed fundamental is the right to refuse
medical treatment. 95 Fundamental rights cannot be waived unless a
person's waiver is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. 96 Therefore,
patients can only waive the fundamental right to refuse medical
treatment if the waiver is made knowingly, voluntarily, and
intelligently.97
A. Fundamental Rights Are Protected by the Constitution
The U.S. Supreme Court considers some rights to be fundamental. As
Justice Cardozo explained, a fundamental right represents the "very
essence of a scheme of ordered liberty ... a 'principle of justice so
rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as
fundamental."'' 98 Some fundamental rights are expressly stated in the
Bill of Rights, 99 while others have been held to originate in the concept
92. Id §§ 12,20.
93. See Dresser, supra note 6, at 819.
94. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26 (1937), rev'd on other grounds, Snyder v.
Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934); see also MILTON R. KONVITZ, FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS:
HISTORY OF A CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE 9 (2001).
95. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261,278 (1990).
96. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970).
97. See Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342, 1368 (D. Mass. 1979), aff'd in part and rev'd in part,
634 F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded sub noam. Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291
(1982), on remand, 738 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1984) (involving a pre-admission agreement requiring the
patient to waive the right to refuse treatment).
98. Palko, 302 U.S. at 325-26 (alteration in original); see also Moore v. City of E. Cleveland,
431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (characterizing fundamental rights as those liberties that are "deeply
rooted in this Nation's history and tradition").
99. U.S. CONST. amends. I-X. For example, the Court has held that the right to free speech and
the right to free exercise of religion are fundamental rights stemming from the Bill of Rights. See
O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987).
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of "liberty" under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 00 Certain fundamental rights protect individuals from
overreaching by the government, like the right to be free from
government intrusion 1' or to have assistance of counsel at a criminal
trial. 0 2 Other rights protect people's bodily integrity, such as the rights
to have children, to marital privacy, to use contraception, and to
terminate one's pregnancy.t13
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that fundamental rights and liberties
deserve more protection and require a greater degree of vigilance than
do other rights. 10 4  The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment provides "heightened protection against government
interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty interests. ' ' 10 5
When a state statute implicating a fundamental right is challenged, the
Court applies the "strict scrutiny" standard of review.'0 6 Under this
standard, the Court will strike down the law infringing on the
fundamental right unless the state can demonstrate that the law is
justified by a compelling state interest °7 and is narrowly tailored. 08
B. The Right to Refuse Medical Treatment Is a Fundamental Right
The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that the fundamental liberty
interest under the Due Process Clause includes the right to refuse
unwanted medical treatment. 09 As early as 1891, the Court noted that
100. See Palko, 302 U.S. at 325; see also Charfauros v. Bd. of Elections, 249 F.3d 941, 951 (9th
Cir. 2001) (stating that the Due Process Clause is the basis for the fundamental rights to get married
and to vote); KONVITZ, supra note 94, at 13.
101. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 280 (1990) (sustaining right to
refuse medical treatment); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (invalidating ban on interracial
marriage).
102. Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 84 (1988) (citing Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344
(1963)).
103. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (listing fundamental rights).
104. KONV1TZ, supra note 94, at 2.
105. Gluecksberg, 521 U.S. at 720.
106. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541-42 (1942) (invalidating an Oklahoma statute
requiring sterilization of habitual criminals and applying strict scrutiny because the statute dealt
with the fundamental rights of marriage and procreation).
107. See Goosby v. Osser, 409 U.S. 512, 519 (1973).
108. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301-02 (1993).
109. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990); Mills v. R6gers, 457 U.S.
291, 300 (1982).
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"no right is held more sacred" than the right of every individual to the
possession and control of his or her own person."0 This "sacred" right
includes the right to refuse medical treatment.]"
The U.S. Supreme Court first recognized the right to refuse medical
treatment in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health."2 In
Cruzan, a young woman was in a terrible car accident that left her on
permanent life support." 3 The young woman's parents wanted to
remove her from the artificial life support, arguing that she had virtually
no chance of recovering her cognitive faculties.' "4 The State of Missouri
refused to allow her family to take her off life support." 5 The State
wanted to require extra evidence beyond the family's testimony to
ensure that the patient herself, if competent, would have wanted to be
removed from life support."l 6 The Court agreed and concluded that a
state could require more evidence of a patient's desire to be removed
from life support than her parents' belief." 
7
In Cruzan, the Court suggested that the right to refuse treatment is
closely related to the requirement of informed consent." 8 Patients must
give informed consent before receiving medical treatment, because the
forcible treatment of a non-consenting person represents a "substantial
interference with that person's liberty." 1 9 As the Court reasoned, if
patients must give informed consent, then, by a "logical corollary," a
patient necessarily has the right to refuse to give consent. 2 '
Recognizing the young woman's right to refuse treatment, the Cruzan
Court noted that even prisoners possess a significant liberty interest in
avoiding unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.' , Justice O'Connor,
110. Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891).
I 1. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278. See generally Kristine Cordier Karnezis, Patient's Right to Refuse
Treatment Allegedly Necessary to Sustain Life, 93 A.L.R.3D 67 (1979) (collecting cases).
112. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).




117. Id. at 280.
118. Id. at 269 (reasoning that informed consent is needed to protect the liberty interests inherent
in the Fourteenth Amendment).
119. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 229 (1990); see also Washington v. Glucksberg, 521
U.S. 702, 725 (1997) (recognizing the "common-law rule that forced medication was a battery").
120. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 270.
121. Harper, 494 U.S. at 221-22.
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concurring in the judgment, reasoned that the liberty guaranteed by the
Due Process Clause must protect an individual's deeply personal
decision to reject medical treatment. 22 The Court recognized the
"principle that a competent person has a constitutionally protected
liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment."' 23 Applying
this principle to the case at hand, the Court held that Missouri could
require stronger evidence of what the patient would have wanted, other
than her parents' belief, had she been competent.'
24
Individual states have also statutorily recognized the fundamental
right to refuse treatment. 25 For example, the Washington State
Legislature recognized the fundamental right to refuse treatment in the
Natural Death Act, which states: "[t]he Legislature finds that adult
persons have the fundamental right to control the decisions relating to
the rendering of their own health care.' 26
People with mental illnesses have a limited right to refuse medical
treatment, although the actual scope of an incompetent person's right to
refuse treatment is unclear.'27 Still, the U.S. Supreme Court has
recognized that, at a minimum, incompetent persons retain a basic right
to refuse treatment. 28 Some lower courts have held that incompetent
persons have the right to refuse medical treatment absent an emergency
situation 29-such as when they pose a danger to themselves or others.
30
122. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 289 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
123. Id. at 278.
124. Id. at 280.
125. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 70.122.010 (2003) (recognizing the right to refuse treatment
in Washington State).
126. Id.
127. See Fleischner, supra note 14, at 790.
128. The U.S. Supreme Court has focused on the right of an incompetent person to refuse
treatment in the criminal context. See, e.g., Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 135 (1992) (stating
that forced medication of a pretrial detainee during trial deprived him of a fair trial); Washington v.
Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 229 (1990) (noting that an incompetent prisoner had a significant
constitutional due process interest in avoiding unwanted administration of mental drugs).
129. See Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d 650, 653 (1st Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded sub nom.
Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982), on remand, 738 F.2d 1 (lst Cir. 1984); see also Guardianship
of Roe, 421 N.E.2d 40, 42 (Mass. 1981) (holding that an incompetent mentally ill patient may have
a right to refuse medication based on the constitutional right to privacy and on the common law).
130. See Elizabeth Ann Rosenfeld, Mental Health Advance Directives: A False Sense of
Autonomy for the Nation's Aging Population, 9 ELDER L.J. 53, 57-58 (2001).
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If patients are incompetent and cannot make any treatment decision, the
patients' guardians can still refuse treatment on their behalf. 3 '
Washington courts also adhere to this principle. 132 The Washington
State Supreme Court has recognized that an "incompetent's right to
refuse treatment should be equal to a competent's right to do so."' 33 As
noted previously, in Washington a person retains the right to refuse
treatment until he or she meets the strict definition of "gravely
disabled."' 34 In addition, the Washington State Supreme Court has held
that an incompetent person's expressed wish to refuse treatment must be
given substantial weight, even if made while the person is
incompetent. 135
C. Fundamental Rights Cannot Be Waived Unless the Waiver Is
Voluntary, Knowing, and Intelligent
The U.S. Supreme Court has been reluctant to recognize waivers of
fundamental rights. 36 The Court has instructed lower courts to indulge
all reasonable presumptions against the waiver of fundamental
constitutional rights. 137 The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit has held that the waiver of a constitutional right is "not to be
implied and is not lightly to be found."' 38 Therefore, courts will presume
that a person has not waived a fundamental right absent clear evidence
of the person's intent, and courts are extremely hesitant to recognize an
implied or inferred waiver.
139
The U.S. Supreme Court applies a three-part test to determine
whether a person has made a valid waiver of a fundamental right: a
131. Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342, 1367 (D. Mass. 1979), aff'd in part and rev 'd in part,
634 F.2d 650 (lst Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded sub noma. Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291
(1982), on remand, 738 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1984) (involving a pre-admission agreement requiring the
patient to waive the right to refuse treatment).
132. See Guardianship of Ingram, 102 Wash. 2d 827, 836, 689 P.2d 1363, 1368 (1984) (noting
that "a judicial finding of incompetence does not deprive [a person of the] right to refuse
treatment").
133. In re Grant, 109 Wash. 2d 545, 553, 747 P.2d 445, 449 (1987).
134. In re Anderson, 17 Wash. App. 690, 692, 564 P.2d 1190, 1192 (1977).
135. Guardianship of Ingram, 102 Wash. 2d at 840, 689 P.2d at 1370.
136. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938); Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389,
393 (1937).
137. Johnson, 304. U.S. at 464.
138. Ostlund v. Bobb, 825 F.2d 1371, 1373 (9th Cir. 1987) (quoting United States v. Provencio,
554 F.2d 361, 363 (9th Cir. 1977)).
139. See Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 515 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring).
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waiver is only valid if it was made voluntarily, knowingly, and
intelligently. 140 This three-part test has developed gradually over time. In
1938, the Court established the "knowing" requirement in Johnson v.
Zerbst.14 1 The Court later required valid waivers to be made knowingly
and voluntarily in Brady v. United States.142 Finally, the Court added the
"intelligent" requirement in both Brady
143 and Miranda v. Arizona.144
This three-part test for waiver of fundamental constitutional rights
applies equally to criminal and civil cases.
145
The U.S. Supreme Court began developing the three-part waiver test
in Johnson, where the Court held that criminal defendants must make
knowing waivers of their fundamental rights to counsel. 146 In Johnson,
two U.S. Marines were convicted of passing counterfeit twenty-dollar
bills. 147 The soldiers, who were not represented by counsel during their
trial, argued on appeal that they were not even aware they had a right to
counsel. 148 Therefore, they claimed their Sixth Amendment rights were
violated. 149 The government argued that the two soldiers waived their
constitutional right to counsel by not asking the trial judge to appoint
lawyers for them.' 
50
Ruling in favor of the soldiers, the Johnson Court noted that the trial
judge has a responsibility to determine on the record whether a
defendant has made a competent waiver of the right to counsel.' 5 ' The
Court stated that that waiver of a fundamental constitutional right should
140. See Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 165 (1990); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,
444 (1966); Brookhardt v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 4 (1966); Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 312
(1930); see also D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 185 (1972); Schell v. Witek, 218
F.3d 1017, 1023 (9th Cir. 2000); Gete v. INS, 121 F.3d 1285, 1293 (9th Cir. 1997); Leonard v.
Clark, 12 F.3d 885, 889 (9th Cir. 1993); Davies v. Grossmont Union High Sch. Dist., 930 F.2d
1390, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991).
141. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
142. 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970).
143. Id.
144. 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
145. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 94 n.31 (1972).
146. Johnson, 304 U.S. at 464.
147. Id. at 460.
148. Id. at 467.
149. Id. at 467-68.
150. See id. at 460, 464.
151. Id. at 465.
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be "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known ilight."'' 52
Therefore, if the soldiers did not even know they had a right to request
counsel, they could not have validly waived that right.' 
53
The Court added another requirement to ensure valid waivers in
Brady by holding that waivers of fundamental rights must also be made
voluntarily. 154 Brady, fearing that a co-defendant who had already plead
guilty would testify against him, plead guilty to kidnapping, thus
avoiding the death penalty.'55 On appeal, Brady argued that his right to
plead "not guilty" was waived involuntarily because he was coerced
under the pressure of the possible application of the death penalty.'
56
The Court rejected this argument, relying on the fact that Brady was
twice questioned by the trial court judge as to the voluntariness of his
plea, 157 as well as the fact that he was represented by competent
counsel.' 58
Therefore, a person's waiver of a fundamental right is not valid if it is
coerced under force or threat of force. 159 For example, waivers of
fundamental rights cannot be obtained by the threat of continued
incarceration. 60 The Court has noted several factors that may indicate
when a waiver of a fundamental right is not voluntary, including
"coercion, terror, inducements, [and] subtle or blatant threats."' 16'
The Brady Court also reaffirmed that waivers of fundamental rights
must be made intelligently, 62 and held that "[w]aivers of constitutional
rights not only must be voluntary but must be knowing, intelligent
acts." 16 3 The Court relied on Miranda in requiring intelligent waivers.
64
152. Id. at 464.
153. See id. at 464-65.
154. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970); see also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436, 444 (1966) (noting that "[tihe defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the
waiver is made voluntarily").
155. Brady, 397 U.S. at 743.
156. Id. at 744.
157. Id. at 743.
158. Id. at 749.
159. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969).
160. Hall v. Ochs, 817 F.2d 920, 923 (1st Cir. 1987).
161. Boykin, 395 U.S. at 243; see also DANIEL PENOFSKY, GUIDELINES FOR INTERROGATIONS:
WAIVER OF RIGHTS UNDER MIRANDA 92, 114 (1967) (noting that other factors indicative of an
involuntary waiver include physical abuse, psychological coercion, trickery, or cajolery).
162. See Brady, 397 U.S. at 748.
163. Id. at 748.
164. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
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An intelligent waiver of rights requires that the party waiving the right
understands the consequences of the waiver. 65 Factors that courts
consider when deciding if a waiver is intelligently made include the age,
educational background, and mental state of the person waiving the
right.' 66 Depression, for example, may be enough to make a waiver
unintelligent because "[d]epression can impair a patient's ability to
understand information, to weigh alternatives, and to make a judgment
that is stable.'
167
D. One Federal Court Has Applied the Knowing, Voluntary, and
Intelligent Test to Waivers of the Fundamental Right to Refuse
Medical Treatment
Although one federal court has applied the three-part waiver test to a
waiver of the right to refuse medical treatment,1 68 no other federal courts
have specifically addressed the issue. In Rogers v. Okin, 169 a federal
district court for the District of Massachusetts held that a patient's
signature on a form, by itself, was not sufficient to meet the knowing,
voluntary, and intelligent waiver test.' 70 In Rogers, all patients were
required to sign a form before being admitted to a mental hospital in
Massachusetts, 17  which stated: "I understand that during my
hospitalization and after any care, I will be given care and treatment
which may include the injection of medicines.' 72 Patients who had
165. See Hardling v. Lewis, 834 F.2d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 1987).
166. PENOFSKY, supra note 161, at 115.
167. Edward Grant & Paul Linton, Relief or Reproach?: Euthanasia Rights in the Wake of
Measure 16, 74 OR. L. REV. 449, 532 (1995).
168. Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342, 1367 (D. Mass. 1979), aff'd in part and revd in part,
634 F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded sub nom. Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291
(1982), on remand, 738 F.2d I (1st Cir. 1984) (involving a pre-admission agreement requiring the
patient to waive the right to refuse treatment).
169. 478 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Mass. 1979), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 634 F.2d 650 (1st Cir.
1980), vacated and remanded sub nom. Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982), on remand, 738 F.2d
1 (lst Cir. 1984).
170. Id. at 1368. Although other parts of the district court's opinion were overturned on appeal,
on subsequent remand neither the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit nor the U.S. Supreme
Court disturbed the district court's holding that there was not a valid waiver of the right to refuse
medical treatment under the facts of the case. See Rogers, 634 F.2d 650; Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S.
291 (1982).
171. Rogers, 478 F. Supp. at 1367.
172. Id. at 1367.
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signed this form argued that the form's language was so vague that it
could not constitute a "knowing[,] voluntary waiver of a constitutional
right to refuse treatment."
173
The district court agreed that merely signing this form did not
constitute a knowing waiver by the patients, and held that "[i]n order for
a court to find a waiver of a right to refuse [treatment], the evidence
must be clear that the patient understood such a right existed and then
elected knowingly and voluntarily to waive such a right."' 74 The court
concluded that the patients had no real choice about whether to sign the
consent form-it was similar to a "take it or leave it" adhesion
contract-and that the written warning the patients signed was
inadequate to notify them that they were waiving fundamental rights.
175
Under these facts, the court held the waiver was invalid because the
knowing and voluntary prongs of the waiver test were not met. 76 The
opinion in Rogers did not specifically address the intelligent prong.1
77
Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court has adopted a three-part waiver test in
order to protect fundamental constitutional rights. For a person to validly
waive a fundamental right, the waiver must be made knowingly,
voluntarily, and intelligently. Consequently, it is likely that such a
waiver is required for a person to give up the fundamental right to refuse
medical treatment.
III. RULES, COURT-MANDATED PROCESSES, AND STATUTES
PROVIDE SAFEGUARDS TO GUARANTEE VOLUNTARY,
KNOWING, AND INTELLIGENT WAIVERS OF
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
There are many contexts in which special procedural safeguards are in
place to ensure that knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waivers are
made. For example, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure allow
defendants to waive the fundamental rights that accompany a criminal
trial, but include a process to ensure that such waivers meet the
"knowing, voluntary, and intelligent" test. 7 8 Similarly, the U.S.
Supreme Court requires police officers to warn arrestees of their





178. FED. R. CRIM. P. I I(b)(2).
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fundamental rights to assistance of counsel and to remain silent before
they can validly waive any of those rights.' 79 Finally, statutes like
Oregon's Death with Dignity Act, which allow a person to waive the
fundamental right to life, contain procedural safeguards in order to
ensure knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waivers of that right. 8 °
A. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure Ensure That a
Defendant's Waiver of Fundamental Trial Rights Is Made
Knowingly, Voluntarily, and Intelligently
An accused individual has a fundamental right to a trial by jury, a
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, and a right to confront
his or her accusers. 181 Entering a plea of guilty or nolo contendere is, in
effect, a waiver of all of these rights that accompany a trial., 82 Therefore,
a defendant's unknowing and involuntary guilty plea will be void.'83
Thus, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure require federal courts to
ensure that defendants' waivers of trial rights are made knowingly,
voluntarily, and intelligently. 
84
First, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 requires procedural
safeguards to ensure that federal defendants make knowing waivers of
their rights. 185 The judge must address the defendant in open court and
explain specific facts concerning the charge to which the defendant has
pleaded guilty and the rights he or she has waived. 86 This requirement
guarantees that defendants know precisely what rights are at stake.
87
179. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
180. See OR. REV. STAT. § 127.815 (2003).
181. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (guaranteeing defendants the right to trial by an impartial jury and to
be confronted with witnesses against them); see also City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 77 n.24
(1980) (concluding that defendant in a criminal case has the "fundamental" right to trial by a jury of
his peers).
182. See Dresser, supra note 6, at 816 (arguing that entering a plea of guilty under FED. R. CRIM.
P. I1 (c)(4) before trial is "a waiver of all the safeguards that accompany a trial").
183. McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 464-65 (1969).
184. Id. at 466.
185. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 1 I(b)(l)(H)-(l) (requiring a judge to tell the defendant the maximum
and minimum penalties the defendant will be subject to should the defendant choose to plead
guilty).
186. FED. R. CRIM. P. 1 (b)(I)(A)-(F).
187. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 1 I(b)(1)(B)-(E) (requiring judges to tell defendants what rights are at
stake).
Washington Law Review
Second, in addition to informing the defendant of his or her rights,
courts also must ensure that a defendant's waiver is made voluntarily.
188
Under Rule 11, the court must determine whether a defendant's guilty
plea is "voluntary and did not result from force, threats or promises"
other than a plea agreement.18 9 Courts may only admit a defendant's
confession into evidence when they are satisfied that the confession was
made voluntarily. 190 Many states require that the judge's determination
of whether there has been an "effective waiver of the right to plead not
guilty" be made on the record. 191
Finally, Rule 11 includes requirements to ensure intelligent waivers.
When a defendant has chosen to plead guilty as part of a plea bargain
agreement reached with the prosecution, the judge must "advise the
defendant that the defendant has no right to withdraw the plea if the
court does not follow [the prosecution's] recommendation or request."'
192
This procedural safeguard helps to ensure that the defendant waives the
right to trial only after being fully informed of the consequences and
risks of the waiver. The scope of Rule 11 was considerably expanded in
1973 to reflect the intent of the original rule which stated simply that a
court "shall not accept ... [a plea of guilty] without first addressing the
defendant personally and determining that the plea is made... with
understanding of the nature of the charge and the consequences of the
plea."' 93 Therefore, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 ensures that
a defendant's waiver of the fundamental right to trial is made knowingly,
voluntarily, and intelligently.
B. The Miranda Warnings in Criminal Interrogations Assure That a
Defendant's Waiver of Fundamental Civil Rights Is Made
Knowingly, Voluntarily, and Intelligently
The U.S. Supreme Court adopted "prophylactic" rules in Miranda v.
Arizona that protect suspects from invalidly waiving fundamental
rights. 94 Under the Sixth Amendment, criminal suspects have the
188. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969).
189. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(2).
190. See Boykin, 395 U.S. at 242 (citing Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 387 (1964)).
191. 1d at 244 n.6; Woods v. Rhay, 68 Wash. 2d 601, 605, 414 P.2d 601, 605 (1966).
192. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 (c)(3)(B).
193. Goodwin v. United States, 687 F.2d 585, 586 n.I (2d Cir. 1982).
194. See Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523, 528 (1987) (interpreting Miranda).
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fundamental right to assistance of counsel, 195 and under the Fifth
Amendment, suspects have the right to remain silent.1 96 When a criminal
suspect is taken into custody, police officers must give five warnings
before interrogating the suspect.1 97 At trial, the prosecution bears the
burden of proving that a defendant's waivers were valid.1
98
Miranda warnings protect criminal suspects from unknowingly
waiving fundamental rights.' 99 Police officers must tell suspects
specifically what their rights are.200 The Miranda warnings require
officers to tell suspects "[y]ou ... have the right to remain silent" and
"[y]ou are entitled to consult with an attorney before interrogation.',
20 1
Courts will not presume that criminal defendants knew that they had a
right to remain silent in the absence of a Miranda warning. 20 2 These
warnings ensure that suspects and defendants are waiving known
rights.20 3
In addition, Miranda warnings protect criminal suspects from
involuntarily waiving fundamental rights. 20 4  Once a suspect is
prosecuted, courts will examine whether a suspect's decision to waive a
right was voluntary in light of the totality of the circumstances.
20 5
Miranda warnings are one factor that courts will take into consideration
because "[o]nce warned, the suspect is free to exercise his own volition
in deciding whether or not to make a statement to the authorities.
206
195. See Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 244 (1936).
196. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
197. PENOFSKY, supra note 161, at 14 (noting that the five required warnings are: (1) that the
accused has the right to remain silent; (2) that any statement made can be used against the accused;
(3) that the accused has the right to consult with an attorney; (4) that the accused has the right to
have an attorney present during any interrogation; and (5) if the accused cannot afford an attorney,
one will be appointed for him).
198. See id. at 7.
199. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966).
200. See id.
201. THOMAS GRISSO, JUVENILES' WAIVER OF RIGHTS 11 (1981) (noting that actual wording of
warnings often varies from state to state).
202. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 468 (explaining that "the Fifth Amendment privilege is so
fundamental to our system of constitutional rule and the expedient of giving an adequate warning as
to the availability of the privilege so simple, we will not pause to inquire in individual cases whether
the defendant was aware of his rights [to remain silent] without a warning being given").
203. See PENOFSKY, supra note 161, at 15.
204. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475.
205. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1976).
206. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 308 (1985).
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Miranda warnings were designed to protect fundamental rights from
government "compulsion, subtle or otherwise" that "operates on the
individual to overcome free choice in producing a statement., 20 7 Later
judicial review ensures that a suspect's waivers were made
voluntarily.
208
Finally, Miranda warnings protect criminal suspects from
unintelligently waiving fundamental rights. 20 9 Police officers inform
suspects of the potential consequences of a decision to waive the right to
silence when they state that "[a]nything you say can and will be used
against you in a court of law., 210 Thus, the Miranda warnings protect
criminal suspects from invalidly waiving their fundamental rights to
assistance of counsel and to remain silent.2 1
C. Oregon's "Death with Dignity" Statute Ensures That a Patient's
Waiver of the Fundamental Right to Life Is Made Knowingly,
Voluntarily, and Intelligently
Statutes allowing citizens to waive fundamental rights can include
procedural protections to guarantee that a waiver is knowingly,
voluntarily, and intelligently made.212 For example, Oregon's Death with
Dignity Act allows patients with terminal conditions to waive their right
to life by taking prescribed medication that will cause their own death.213
The right to life is a fundamental right. 214 Therefore, Oregon has
included special protections in its Death with Dignity Act to ensure that
any waiver of the fundamental right to life meets the U.S. Supreme
Court's three-part waiver test.215
Oregon's legislation-originally an initiative that voters passed-
includes safeguards to protect vulnerable individuals.21 6 Similar ballot
207. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474.
208. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227.
209. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475.
210. GRISSO, supra note 201, at 11.
211. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475.
212. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 127.815(1)(c) (2003) (requiring physicians to make sure patient
is "making an informed decision" before physician can prescribe life-ending medication to that
patient).
213. Id.
214. See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 409 (1986).
215. See OR. REV. STAT. § 127.815.
216. Cheryl K. Smith, Oregons Measure 16: Once More to the Ballot Box, available at
http://www.ncf.carleton.ca/ip/social.services/rt-die/joumal/oregon (last visited July 10, 2003).
Vol. 78:795, 2003
Mental Health Advance Directives
measures failed in California and Washington because opponents
successfully convinced voters that the bills did not contain adequate
safeguards.' 7 The drafters of the subsequent Oregon measure took this
into consideration. 21 8 They knew that Oregon voters would be more
likely to support the bill if it contained protections to ensure that people
would seriously consider their decision to end their own lives, and to
guarantee that this decision would be made in light of all the relevant
information.
2 19
As a result, Oregon's Death with Dignity Act provides in relevant part
that before a physician can prescribe life-ending medication:
(1) The attending physician shall:
(a) Make the initial determination of whether a patient has a
terminal disease, is capable, and has made the request
voluntarily;
(c) To ensure that the patient is making an informed
decision, inform the patient of:
(A) His or her medical diagnosis;
(B) His or her prognosis;
(C) The potential risks associated with taking the
medication to be prescribed;
(D) The probable result of taking the medication to be
prescribed; and
(E) The feasible alternatives, including, but not limited
to, comfort care, hospice care and pain control;
(d) Refer the patient to a consulting physician for medical
confirmation of the diagnosis, and for a determination that
the patient is capable and acting voluntarily;
(e) Refer the patient for counseling if appropriate...;
(h) Inform the patient that he or she has an opportunity to





220. OR. REV. STAT. § 127.815.
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Although the Oregon statute specifically addresses the voluntary and
intelligent prongs, it does not contain provisions specifically aimed at
ensuring "knowing" waivers, such as a provision requiring physicians to
tell patients that they have a fundamental right to life.22' Perhaps the
drafters assumed that it is common knowledge that the right to continue
living is fundamental.222
Oregon's Death with Dignity Act does include protections to
guarantee that waivers of the fundamental right to life are made
voluntarily.223 The physician must make a good faith effort to determine
whether the patient is voluntarily asking to give up his or her right to
life.224 Moreover, Oregon's statute addresses the intelligent waiver
prong.225 Oregon requires health care providers to sit down with a
patient who is considering physician-assisted suicide and explain the
potential risks of the decision. 6 When patients choose to be removed
from life support or to take a prescribed medication to end their own
lives, a physician is required to explain the options, alternatives, and
risks. 227 These requirements ensure that any waiver is made intelligently.
Oregon requires a face-to-face verbal warning from the doctor before
patients are allowed to waive their rights. 228 By requiring the attending
physician to have this conversation with a person who is considering
waiving his or her right to life, Oregon's Death with Dignity Act
protects its citizens from unknowingly, involuntarily, or unintelligently
waiving their rights.
Thus, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11, Miranda warnings, and
Oregon's Death with Dignity Act all include provisions to ensure
knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waivers of fundamental rights.
Under Rule 11, a federal judge must tell criminal defendants what rights
they forfeit by pleading guilty.229 Likewise, Miranda warnings require
221. Id. § 127.815(1)(a)-(c).
222. See Woods v. Niertheimer, 328 U.S. 211, 216 (1946) (noting that the "fundamental rights to
life and liberty are guaranteed by the United States Constitution").
223. OR. REV. STAT. § 127.815(1)(a).
224. See Grant & Linton, supra note 167, at 528.
225. OR. REV. STAT. § 127.815(I)(c)(A)-(E).
226. See id. § 127.815(I)(c)(C).
227. See id. § 127.815(l)(a)-(c).
228. See id. While the Oregon statute does not explicitly require that the communication be face-
to-face, it is reasonable to assume that most doctors talk with their patients in person before
prescribing medication to the patient allowing the patient to end his or her own life.
229. FED. R. CRIM. P. I I(a)(1)(B)-(E).
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police officers to tell suspects what their rights are and explain the
consequences of waiving those rights.2 30 Finally, Oregon's Death with
Dignity Act requires physicians to meet with patients to discuss the risks
and alternatives before the physician can prescribe lethal medication for
patients wanting to waive their right to life. 231 These procedures help
ensure that waivers of fundamental rights meet the U.S. Supreme
Court's three-part test.
IV. WASHINGTON'S ADVANCE DIRECTIVE LAW SHOULD BE
AMENDED TO INCLUDE PROTECTIONS AT THE
EXECUTION STAGE THAT WILL GUARANTEE KNOWING
AND INTELLIGENT WAIVERS
Although Washington's new law authorizing mental health advance
directives provides many benefits,232 it may be unconstitutional as
passed because it does not ensure that waivers of the fundamental right
to refuse treatment will be made knowingly and intelligently. With
minor changes to the new law, the Washington Legislature could fix this
shortcoming and guarantee that patients' waivers of fundamental rights
will meet the U.S. Supreme Court's three-part test.
A. Washington's Mental Health Advance Directive Law Contains
Insufficient Safeguards in the Execution Stage to Meet the
"Knowing, Voluntary, and Intelligent" Test
Washington's mental health advance directive law fails to guarantee
that patients will make knowing and intelligent waivers of their
fundamental right to refuse medical treatment. Under the law, patients
could sign an irrevocable advance directive that effectively constitutes a
waiver of their right to refuse treatment in the future. Although the
Washington law includes sufficient safeguards to ensure that such a
waiver is voluntary, it fails to guarantee that a waiver is made knowingly
230. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966).
231. OR. REV. STAT. § 127.815(I)(a)-(c).
232. Interview with Lisa Brodoff, Professor, Seattle University School of Law, in Seattle, Wash.
(Nov. 14, 2002) (explaining that the drafters of the proposed legislation tried to ensure a great deal
of choice to the mentally ill); see, e.g., Mental Health Advance Directives, supra note 3, § 6(3),
(allowing patients the freedom to choose the point in time when their directive will become
effective).
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and intelligently in accordance with the Johnson test.233 In fact, the bill
provides even less protection against unknowing waivers than the
protections held insufficient in Rogers.
234
Signing an irrevocable advance directive constitutes a waiver of a
patient's fundamental rights.235 Even incompetent persons retain the
fundamental right to refuse treatment.236 In Washington, a patient retains
the right to refuse treatment until the person meets the strict definition of
"gravely disabled., 237 Signing an irrevocable advance directive can
cause a patient to effectively give up his or her right to refuse treatment
in the future.238 Therefore, signing an irrevocable mental health advance
directive constitutes a waiver of a fundamental right. Because
Washington's mental health advance directive law allows patients to
waive their future right to refuse treatment, it must include safeguards to
ensure that such waivers meet the knowing, voluntary, and intelligent
test.
2 39
The drafters of Washington's mental health advance directive law
adequately addressed one part of the U.S. Supreme Court's three-part
"knowing, voluntary, and intelligent" test.240 The law ensures that
patients will make voluntary waivers by requiring two adult witnesses to
attest to the fact that the patient signed voluntarily at the time the
advance directive was executed. 24 The witnesses must certify that the
233. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
234. See Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342, 1367 (D. Mass. 1979), aff'd in part and rev'd in
part, 634 F.2d 650 (1 st Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded sub nom. Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291
(1982), on remand, 738 F.2d I (lst Cir. 1984).
235. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
236. See, e.g., Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 135 (1992) (stating that forced medication of a
pretrial detainee during trial deprived him of a fair trial); Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 229
(1990) (noting that an incompetent prisoner had a significant constitutional due process interest in
avoiding unwanted administration of mental drugs).
237. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.05.030 (2003); see also In re Anderson, 17 Wash. App. 690, 692,
564 P.2d 1190, 1192 (1977).
238. Dresser, supra note 6, at 819 (arguing that signing a voluntary commitment contract, which
is similar to an irrevocable advance directive, involves a waiver of rights).
239. See Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 165 (1990); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,
444 (1966); Brookhardt v. Janis, 384 U.S. I, 4 (1966); Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 312
(1930); see also D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 185 (1972); Schell v. Witek, 218
F.3d 1017, 1023 (9th Cir. 2000); Gete v. INS, 121 F.3d 1285, 1293 (9th Cir. 1997); Leonard v.
Clark, 12 F.3d 885, 889 (9th Cir. 1993); Davies v. Grossmont Union High Sch. Dist., 930 F.2d
1390, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991).
240. Mental Health Advance Directives, supra note 3, § 6(l)(e).
241. Id.
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patient did not appear incapacitated at the time of signing.2 42 Although
the legislation protects against involuntary waivers, no provisions are
included to guarantee that waivers of the right to refuse treatment are
made knowingly or intelligently.243 As a result, Washington's law
contains insufficient safeguards to ensure that the advance directives will
withstand constitutional scrutiny.
The Washington statute fails to meet the Johnson test that requires
waivers to be made knowingly.244 Much like the two Marines in Johnson
who did not know they had a fundamental right to counsel,2 45 some
patients who execute mental health advance directives may not know
they have a fundamental right to refuse treatment. Moreover, the new
Washington law includes no requirement that those executing an
advance directive be informed that they are giving up a fundamental
right to refuse treatment.246 This is in striking contrast to Johnson where
the U.S. Supreme Court required trial judges to inform defendants of
their right to request counsel.247
Further, the Washington law provides even less protection against an
unknowing waiver of the fundamental right to refuse treatment than the
mental hospital did in Rogers v. Okin.248 In Rogers, patients had to sign a
form acknowledging that they would be given treatment once they
entered the hospital.249 Yet, the court held that this form was not enough
to constitute a knowing waiver of the right to refuse treatment.250 Thus, a
court may require more than a mere written acknowledgment of rights to
ensure that patients are knowingly waiving a right. 251 The form included
in the Washington law refers to potential treatment or medication in
terms of "preferences," 252 but never mentions the waiver of a right to
refuse treatment. The Washington law thus provides even less protection
242. Id. (requiring witnesses to certify that the person signing an advance directive does not
appear to be acting under fraud, undue influence, or duress).
243. See id.
244. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
245. Id. at 467.
246. See Mental Health Advance Directives, supra note 3.
247. Johnson, 304 U.S. at 465.
248. 478 F. Supp. 1342 (1979).
249. Id. at 1367.
250. Id.
251. See id.
252. Mental Health Advance Directives, supra note 3, § 26 (Part V).
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against an unknowing waiver than the protection that the court held
insufficient in Rogers.253 Therefore, the Washington law does not meet
the knowing requirement set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court.
Additionally, Washington's statute does not guarantee that patients
will make intelligent waivers of their fundamental rights, because it does
not ensure that patients will know the consequences, risks, and
alternatives to signing an irrevocable advance directive. In contrast to
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11, which requires judges to warn
defendants of the possible consequences of waiving the right to a trial,254
the Washington statute does not require someone to explain to patients
the consequences of signing an irrevocable advance directive. Also,
unlike Oregon's Death with Dignity Act, which requires a physician to
explain alternatives to a patient,255 Washington's statute does not require
anyone to explain to patients the alternatives to signing irrevocable
advance directives. Therefore, the Washington law does not ensure that
patients will intelligently waive the fundamental right to refuse
treatment.
Thus, Washington's mental health advance directive law fails to
ensure that patients will make knowing and intelligent waivers of their
fundamental right to refuse medical treatment. Under the new law, it
would be possible for a fully competent person to sign an irrevocable
advance directive without realizing that the document waived his or her
fundamental right to refuse medical treatment at a later time. Under such
circumstances, the directive would be open to legal challenges. For
example, imagine that two witnesses certify that a patient is "competent"
to sign a directive, but that patient is clinically depressed. It is certainly
possible for two witnesses to be unaware of a patient's clinical
depression. Though the patient signs the directive voluntarily, the
depression may be enough to make the waiver unknowing or
unintelligent because "depression can impair a patient's ability to
understand information, to weigh alternatives, and to make a judgment
that is stable. 256 Without more, Washington's statute permits such a
patient to waive the fundamental right to refuse medical treatment
without even realizing it. This unfortunate possibility stands in stark
253. See id
254. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1)(A)-(F).
255. OR. REV. STAT. § 127.815 (2003).
256. Grand & Linton, supra note 167, at 532 n.352.
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contrast to the expressed desires of those citizens who initially advocated
for mental health advance directives in Washington.257
B. A "Rights Advocate" and a Written Warning Would Provide the
Necessary Protections Against Unknowing Waiver
With two minor changes, the Washington State Legislature could
guarantee that the advance directive law would ensure knowing and
intelligent waivers. First, the statute should be amended to require a
"rights advocate" to explain to the patient that an irrevocable directive is
a waiver of the fundamental right to refuse treatment, and discuss the
possible risks of and alternatives to using an advance directive. Second,
the advance directive form should include a written warning that signing
an irrevocable advance directive could constitute a waiver of the
fundamental right to refuse treatment.
The Washington State Legislature should require a "rights advocate"
to explain that the patient is waiving a fundamental right, and to discuss
the potential consequences of that waiver before the patient signs an
irrevocable advance directive. This rights advocate should be a
disinterested person with no other relation to the principal who has a
basic understanding of Washington law and of the fundamental right to
refuse treatment. The rights advocate could be an attorney, a social
worker, or a health care professional. Similar to Miranda warnings
258
and Oregon's Death with Dignity Act,259 this requirement should be
mandatory when the patient selects an irrevocable advance directive in
Washington.26° If the patient retains the right to revoke the directive at
any time,26' the fundamental right to refuse medical treatment is not
waived and a "rights advocate" is not needed. However, when a patient
decides that the directive should be irrevocable during subsequent
262 hsAincapacity, a "rights advocate" can ensure that the patient understandsthat doing so waives the fundamental right to refuse medical treatment.
257. SREBNIK & BRODOFF, supra note 36, at 10 (noting that "a prominent concern of [potential
advance directive users in Washington] was whether [they] would have sufficient information and
competency to execute" advance directives).
258. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S 436, 475 (1966); see also supra note 197.
259. See OR. REV. STAT. § 127.815.




Essentially, the rights advocate should act like the physician in Oregon's
Death with Dignity Act, explaining the risks, consequences, and
alternatives to signing an irrevocable advance directive. 263 Thus, a rights
advocate would bring an advance directive in line with the theory of
informed consent. This will help guarantee that the patient's waiver is
intelligent and made in light of all the relevant information.
Once the rights advocate has informed the patient, the advocate
should sign a certification stating that the patient has been advised of his
or her rights. A court could refer to the certification if the directive is
subsequently challenged.264  To accomplish this, the Washington
Legislature should amend its mental health advance directive law to
include the following:
If the principal has elected to be unable to revoke the directive
during any period of incapacity, the directive shall include a
certification by a rights advocate that states in substance as
follows: "I am a disinterested attorney, social worker, or health
care professional. I certify that I am familiar with the provisions
of the Involuntary Treatment Act, the mental health advance
directive authorized under this statute and the constitutionally
protected fundamental right to refuse medical treatment. I met
with the principal prior to the execution of this directive and
advised him/her concerning his/her rights. In connection with
this directive, I advised him/her about the risks involved, the
possible legal and medical consequences of signing or not
signing this directive, and available alternatives to signing the
directive. In particular, I advised the principal that by signing
this directive he/she was effectively waiving the fundamental
right to refuse treatment in the future. 265
This language will ensure that the patient is advised-by an impartial
rights advocate-of the legal consequences of signing the directive,
including the fact that it constitutes a waiver of a fundamental right.
A second change to the advance directive statute, adding a warning in
the advance directive form, would also help prevent patients from
signing advance directives without knowing they are waiving
fundamental rights. The new statute includes a sample form directive
263. See OR. REV. STAT. § 127.815.
264. See Mental Health Advance Directives, supra note 3, §§ 12, 20.
265. Similar language was first proposed by Karen Boxx, Professor, University of Washington
School of Law, at a Mental Health Advance Directives for Health Care stakeholders meeting in
Olympia, Washington on December 3, 2002.
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that patients can use.266 This form should be amended to include a
warning that signing an irrevocable directive may constitute a waiver of
a fundamental right. At present, the form requires those who want an
irrevocable directive to sign under a statement that says:
"I... understand that if I choose this option and become incapacitated
while this directive is in effect, I may receive treatment that I specify in
this directive, even if I object at the time. 2 67 This statement should be
expanded and clarified to include a second sentence that reads: "I further
understand that I have a fundamental constitutional right to refuse
medical treatment. I understand that by choosing to execute an
irrevocable directive I may be waiving my fundamental right to refuse
medical treatment." Much like the explanations provided by rights
advocate, such a written warning would ensure that patients make
knowing waivers of the fundamental right to refuse treatment. Although
the rights advocate may be a more personal and effective means of
guaranteeing a knowing waiver, requiring both oral and written warnings
would create two levels of procedural protection.
C. By Making These Changes, the Washington State Legislature Can
Ensure That Mental Health Advance Directives Will Be
Constitutional and Enforceable
If the Washington advance directive statute is amended to include
these two changes, courts will most likely uphold irrevocable advance
directives as knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waivers of the
fundamental right to refuse treatment. As passed, the law satisfies the
voluntary requirement,2 68 but fails to meet the knowing and intelligent
requirements. The proposed changes will rectify this failure in multiple
ways.
First, the amended statute would ensure knowing waivers if it requires
a rights advocate to explain that patients are giving up a fundamental
right when they sign an irrevocable directive. This explanation of rights
is similar to police officers telling suspects that they "have the right to
remain silent" as part of a Miranda warning.269 It is also akin to a judge
266. Mental Health Advance Directives, supra note 3, § 26.
267. Id. § 26 (Part IV).
268. Id. § 6(l)(e); see also supra note 241 and accompanying text.
269. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S 436, 475 (1966); see also supra note 197.
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informing defendants that they have the right to a trial and do not have to
plead guilty.270 The rights advocate would be able to guarantee that the
patient knows about his or her rights. Thus, requiring a rights advocate
would ensure that the Washington statute meets the Johnson test.
27'
Further, if the advance directive form states that the person is waiving a
fundamental right, it will be more clear and specific than the form used
in Rogers.2 72 Therefore, with these two changes, the law would ensure
that patients make knowing waivers of their fundamental right to refuse
treatment.
Additionally, the amended statute would ensure intelligent waivers if
it requires a rights advocate to tell a patient about the risks,
consequences, and alternatives of signing an irrevocable directive. Such
information is analogous to the explanations that must be given by a
physician under Oregon's Death with Dignity Act,2 73 and by a judge
acting under Rule 11.274 Adding a requirement for a rights advocate
would allow patients to make an informed decision before signing an
irrevocable directive. Therefore, the rights advocate would ensure that
the patient intelligently waives his or her fundamental right to refuse
treatment, as required by both Brady and Miranda.275
Finally, these protections would make irrevocable directives more
enforceable. If a patient becomes incompetent and subsequently tries to
challenge his or her directive in court, 27 6 the person's signature on the
form and the certification of the rights advocate would provide the court
with evidence that the patient validly waived his or her right to refuse
treatment.
V. CONCLUSION
The new Washington statute authorizing mental health advance
directives stems from good intentions. However, there is a risk that the
270. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 1(b)(1)(A)-(F).
271. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1968).
272. See Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342, 1367 (D. Mass. 1979), aff'd in part and rev'd in
part, 634 F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded sub nom. Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291
(1982), on remand, 738 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1984).
273. See OR. REV. STAT. § 127.815 (2003).
274. See FED. R. CRIM. P. I I(b)(1)(A)-(F).
275. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444
(1966); see also supra note 162 and accompanying text.
276. Mental Health Advance Directives, supra note 3, §§ 12, 20.
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statute could be successfully challenged as a violation of the U.S.
Supreme Court's requirement that fundamental rights can only be
waived knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. By adding the simple
procedural safeguards of a "rights advocate" at the signing stage, and a
clear warning in the form, an amended version of the advance directive
law should withstand a constitutional challenge. Consequently, Dr.
Jekyll would be protected from inadvertently waiving Mr. Hyde's
fundamental right to refuse treatment.
830
